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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Timothy Charles Condon appeals from the district court's summary
dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Underlying Criminal Proceedings (S.Ct.
Docket No. 38584) 1
Condon was charged with felony driving under the influence and with
being a persistent violator. (38584 R., pp.1-6; 40346 R., pp.4, 99, 102, 141142.) Bond was set at one million dollars ($1,000,000). (38584 R., pp.7-9;
40346 R., pp.14, 102, 116, 150.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Condon pied
guilty to felony driving under the influence in exchange for the dismissal of the
persistent violator charge. (38584 R., pp.10, 17-20, 27; 40346 R., pp.4, 99;
38584 Change of Plea Tr., p.2, Ls.10-14.) Condon's counsel filed a motion
for pre-sentencing release, on the basis that bond was excessive, so that
Condon could obtain treatment at the Rescue Mission. (38584 R., pp.23-24;
40346 R., pp.16, 17, 84-85, 102, 109.) At the hearing on the motion for pretrial release, Condon's counsel withdrew the motion. (38584 R., p.25; 40346

R., p.102.)

Condon's counsel then asked for an earlier sentencing date,

which the district court granted. (38584 R., p.25; 40346 R., p.102.)
At the sentencing hearing fourteen days later, the district court entered
judgment and imposed a unified sentence of ten years with five years fixed.

Condon is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion
requesting that the Idaho Supreme Court take Judicial Notice of the clerk's
record and transcripts in the direct appeal from his underlying criminal
conviction, State v. Condon, S.Ct. No. 38584.
1

1

(38584 R., pp. 27, 34, 49-50; 40346 R., pp.4, 56, 99, 142.) In determining the
length of that sentence, the district court relied, in part, on Condon's failure to
obtain or complete alcohol treatment, as well as the alcohol evaluation's
recommendation that Condon undertake intensive inpatient treatment.
(38584 Sent. Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.20; p.19, L.24 - p.20, L.3; p.22, L.20 p.23, L.2; p.24, Ls.19-21; 40346 R. pp.55-56.) Condon filed a prose Rule 35
motion, which was denied. (38584 Augmentation Record; 40346 R., pp.5, 8688, 92-98, 99, 142.) Condon timely appealed. (38584 R., pp.35-37, 40-44;
40346 R., pp.5, 99, 142.)
On direct appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Condon's
sentence and the denial of his Rule 35 motion.

State v. Condon, 2011

Unpublished Opinion No. 697 (Ct. App. November 14, 2011); (R., pp.99-100).

Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings (S.Ct. Docket No. 40346)
Condon filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief (40346
R., pp.4-17), and moved for the appointment of counsel to represent him
(40346 R., pp.18-28). Among the allegations made by Condon was a claim
that his trial counsel was ineffective because he had not pursued Condon's
request that he challenge Condon's excessive bail, and that Condon had a
bed waiting for him at the intensive inpatient treatment program at the Rescue
Mission prior to sentencing. (40346 R., pp.6, 13, 14, 16-17.)
Counsel was appointed and given the opportunity to file an amended
petition (40346 R., pp.29-34, 38-44, 61-62), but, after obtaining the
sentencing transcripts, elected not to do so (40346 R., pp.45-60, 70-71, 141).

2

The state filed a motion for summary dismissal arguing, with regard to
Condon's excessive bail/ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that Condon
had not alleged specific facts in support of his claim, that Condon had not
alleged how he was prejudiced, and that his claim was disproven by the
record because trial counsel had actually filed a motion to reduce bail,
although he later withdrew it. (40346 R., pp.101, 108-109.) The district court
held a hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, and asked the
parties to submit closing arguments in writing. (40346 R., pp.112-115.) The
district court took notice of the proceedings in the underlying criminal case
and indicated it would take the matter under advisement. (40346 R., pp.113,
115, 141-143; 40346 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-29; p.51, L.13 - p.52, L.16.)
In her written closing arguments, Condon's post-conviction counsel,
based upon the allegations made in Condon's petition and in response to the
state's argument at the hearing (40346 Tr., p.37, Ls.5-12), made clear the
prejudice to Condon by his trial attorney's failure to pursue the motion to
reduce bail: "had his bail been set reasonably - or had he been released to
treatment, he could have shown the Court and his pre-sentence [investigator]
that he was amenable to treatment and receive a lighter sentence." (40346
R., p.120.)

The district court issued a written order granting the state's motion for
summary disposition. (40346 R., pp.140-156.) Addressing Condon's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel in pursuing a challenge to his excessive bail,
the district court accepted the state's argument that Condon's claim was

3

disproven by the record, and that Condon could not prove prejudice, because,
according to the district court, Condon's trial attorney's act of withdrawing the
motion for pre-sentencing release benefitted Condon.
153.)

(40346 R., pp.152-

Condon timely appealed from the district court's order summarily

dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. (40346 R., pp.159-163.)

4

ISSUE
Condon's trial counsel filed a motion for his pre-trial release without
bail, on the grounds that bail was excessive, so that Condon could begin
alcohol treatment prior to sentencing. Counsel later withdrew the motion and
asked that sentencing be expedited. At sentencing, the district court relied, in
part, on Condon's failure to ever obtain or complete alcohol treatment when it
determined his unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed. Did the
district court err when it summarily dismissed Condon's claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective in his handling of the issue of Condon's excessive
bail?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Condon's Claim That
His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective In Handling The Issue Of Condon's
Excessive Bail
A.

Introduction
When liberally construed in Condon's favor, the factual allegations

Condon presented in his post-conviction petition and supporting materials, the
facts in the record before the district court, and the reasonable inferences
therefrom raised a genuine issue of material fact of whether trial counsel was
ineffective with regard to his handling of Condon's excessive bail when he
withdrew Condon's motion for excessive bail, preventing Condon from
obtaining the benefit of pre-sentencing alcohol treatment, which might have
induced the sentencing judge to impose a lesser sentence. The district court
erred when it summarily dismissed this claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material
fact exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the
applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839
P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d
749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate court will liberally construe the facts
and reasonable inferences in favor of the petitioner. Hauschulz v. State, 144
Idaho 834, 838, 172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007).

6

C.

General Legal Standards Applicable to Post-Conviction Proceedings
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550
(1983); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 315, 900 P.2d 221, 223 (Ct. App.
1995). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint
in an ordinary civil action.

A petition must contain more than "a short and

plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Martinez v.
State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1995) (referencing
I.R.C.P. 8).

The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal

knowledge and produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.

kl

(citing I.C. § 19-4903).
A court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory
allegations,

unsupported

by

admissible

evidence,

or

the

applicant's

conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001 ); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application
for post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative.

Summary dismissal is akin to summary judgment.

Hassett, 127

Idaho at 315, 900 P.2d at 223 (referencing I.R.C.P. 56). A claim for postconviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 if
the applicant "has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to
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each essential element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the
burden of proof."

Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518, 960 P.2d 738, 739

(1998); Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at 901.
Dismissal is proper where the evidence controverts an essential
element of the applicant's claim or does not support relief as a matter of law.
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975); Wilson v.
State, 133 Idaho 874, 878, 993 P.2d 1205, 1209 (Ct. App. 2000). However, if
an applicant presents a material factual issue, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.
App. 1991).

D.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Condon's Claim That
His Trial Counsel Ineffectively Handled The Issue Of Excessive Bail
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). The petitioner must demonstrate: 1) that counsel's performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and 2) that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The
"prejudice" requirement focuses on whether counsel's deficient performance
affected the outcome of the case. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes that "trial counsel was
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competent and that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v.
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's
strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve
as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless
the UPCPA petitioner has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of
objective review.

Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368

(1994); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46
(Ct. App. 1990).
Condon's petition alleged that Condon's trial counsel was ineffective
because he "did not bring up excessive bail issues." (40346 R., pp.6, 13, 14.)
A reasonable inference from this allegation is that it is not limited to whether
counsel filed the motion, but whether he truly brought it before the court for its
consideration and ruling.

To support the second prong of ineffective

assistance of counsel, whether he had been prejudiced by the failure to
pursue the motion, Condon alleged that prior to sentencing he had obtained a
bed at an alcohol treatment facility (40346 R., pp.16, 17), and provided
sentencing transcripts that demonstrated the judge relied, in part, on
Condon's failure to obtain or complete alcohol treatment when it imposed the
five-year fixed sentence (38584 Sent. Tr., p.17, L.23 - p.18, L.20; p.19, L.24 p.20, L.3; p.22, L.20 - p.23, L.2; p.24, Ls.19-21; 40346 R. pp.55-56.). The
record before the court established that trial counsel did file a motion for presentencing release, based on Condon's excessive bail, to allow Condon to be

9

released to obtain alcohol treatment (38584 R., pp.23-24; 40346 R., pp.16-17,
84-85, 102, 109) but withdrew that motion prior to sentencing, and then asked
that sentencing be expedited (38584 R., p.25; 40346 R., pp.102, 150).
Condon's post-conviction counsel made clear the prejudice to Condon by this
action: "had his bail been set reasonably - or had he been released to
treatment, he could have shown the Court and his pre-sentence [investigator]
that he was amenable to treatment and receive a lighter sentence." (40346
R., p.120.)

Counsel for the state agreed that the motion for pre-sentencing release
was based on excessive bail and the availability of a bed at the Rescue
Mission.

(40346 R., pp.102, 109.) Counsel for the state agreed that trial

counsel withdrew the motion "and instead asked the court to move [Condon's]
sentencing date from March 28, 2011, when it was originally scheduled, to
February 15, 2011." (40346 R., p.102.) Condon's essential allegations as to
deficient performance (filing but withdrawing the motion) and prejudice
(withdrawing the motion prior to sentencing despite the availability of a bed at
a treatment facility) were thus not only alleged but uncontroverted by the
state.

Because Condon had presented a material factual issue, "an

evidentiary hearing must be conducted." Gonzales, 120 Idaho at 763, 819
P.2d at 1163.
The state argued below, however, that "[t]he court granted this
scheduling change to allow [Condon] the opportunity to be released from jail."
(40346 R., p.102.) The state, guessing as to trial counsel's motives, posited
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"I think it's apparent that the trial attorney didn't think he could be successful
on the motion, and so having the petitioner sentenced earlier would allow him
to spend less time in the County Jail and move forward on his sentence."
(40346 Tr., p.37, Ls.7-12.)

On its face, this is conjecture and does not

disprove or undermine Condon's allegations of deficient performance or
prejudice. It is difficult to conceive of what tangible benefit would accrue to
Condon by this action.

Expediting sentencing simply meant that Condon

accrued his credit for time served in a state prison rather than a county jail.
This is not a benefit, let alone one on par with obtaining alcohol treatment to
demonstrate to a sentencing judge that a more lenient sentence would be
reasonable. Withdrawing the motion meant Condon would definitely not be
released prior to sentencing, and so would definitely not have the opportunity
to enter treatment and show the district court that he was serious and could
succeed, to the end that he could possibly be seen as being worth a more
lenient sentence, to whatever degree.

Such a move does not serve any

strategic or tactical purpose, and is contrary to Condon's interest in
presenting the best possible case at sentencing. It is deficient conduct that
resulted in prejudice to Condon's case.
The district court, however, expanded on the state's conjecture as to
trial counsel's reasons for withdrawing the motion for pre-sentencing release,
finding that trial counsel withdrew the motion for pre-sentencing release "in
exchange for the sentencing date to be moved from March 28, 2011 until
February 15, 2011" (40346 R., p.150), or, stated alternately, "so that the
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defendant could have resolution of the matter without having to be
incarcerated in the Canyon County Jail for an additional six weeks" (40346 R.,
p.152).

Even accepting, for the purposes of argument only, that there is

support in the record for such a finding, it does not support the ultimate
conclusion that Condon's allegation that this is deficient performance and that
he was prejudiced thereby were insufficient or somehow disproven by the
record.

At best, they beg the question, again, of what possible strategic

benefit such a move could have been. The district court erred when it made
this conclusion, and erred when it did not recognize this as precisely the sort
of material factual issue that must be resolved at an evidentiary hearing.
The district court erred when it relied on counsel's decision to withdraw
Condon's request for release, and characterized it as an exchange for a
speedier sentencing, as support for its determinations that trial counsel's
actions were objectively reasonable and that Condon did not allege prejudice.
There exist factual issues for hearing as to whether counsel's performance
was deficient and to what extent the deficiency prejudiced Condon's ability to
present his best case at sentencing. Because Condon supported both prongs
with factual allegations that remained in dispute, the district court erred when
it dismissed this claim without an evidentiary hearing.
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CONCLUSION
Condon's petition and supporting materials present a genuine issue of
material fact regarding his trial counsel's handling of the excessive bail issue.
Condon respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's summary
dismissal and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on Condon's claim
that his trial counsel rendered him ineffective assistance with the reduction of
his excessive bail, preventing him from obtaining alcohol treatment before
sentencing.

DATED this ~day of February, 2013.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ y of February, 2013, I caused two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be handdelivered to the Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court for:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
P.O. BOX 83720
BOISE, ID 83720-0010
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